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1. Introduction 
Austin Sarat has described the transcript as “the verbatim record of a present soon to 
become past, a mirror / a record / a voice machine in which the “author” exercises no 
authorial presence.”1  In this paper I argue that by seeing a transcript as an authorless 
mirror of court proceedings, socio-legal scholars risk overlooking the ways in which the 
technology of transcripts influences the record that is produced.  Paying attention to the 
laws and practices governing transcript production allows those who engage in transcript 
                                                      
1 Austin Sarat, “Rhetoric and Remembrance: Trials, Transcription, and the Politics of Critical Reading” 
(1999) 23 Legal Studies Forum 355 at 356.  (Accessed electronically via Lexis Nexis on 9 March 2005.) 
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research to appreciate how the transcript is defined in relation to the spoken proceedings 
it purports to represent even while the act of representation alters those proceedings.   
This paper contributes to the large body of work that has been produced in recent years 
by law and society scholars on legal transcripts.  Profoundly influenced by Foucault, 
socio-legal transcript research is largely concerned with unearthing law’s “untold stories” 
and placing legal decisions back within the context of the legal and social disagreements 
from which they arise.  Foucault-influenced socio-legal scholars use transcripts in their 
quest to understand “the methods by which established meanings are derived, or rather, 
the means by which alternative meanings are hidden [by a court’s judgment] … what 
counts as success in this particular context.”2  In section two, I discuss some of the work 
that has been done by these scholars and explain how this work has added to our 
understanding of the adversarial legal process as a contest for the power to ascribe 
meaning to a particular event (or set of events) after they have taken place.3   
Studying transcripts allows socio-legal scholars to reclaim the meanings that are hidden 
or delegitimated by the legal act of deciding a case.  This reclamation complements the 
work of lawyers and activists who bring marginal cases before the courts in order to 
memorialise particular events, sometimes with little hope of succeeding in their legal 
claims.4  Law’s promise to listen to marginal stories is not always fulfilled in the 
                                                      
2 Desmond Manderson, “Apocryphal Jurisprudence” (2001) 23 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 81 at 
90. 
3 Ibid, at 87.  See also Austin Sarat, and Thomas Kearns, “Writing History and Registering Memory in 
Legal Decisions and Legal Practice: An Introduction” in Sarat and Kearns (eds.) History, Memory and the 
Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999) at 3. 
4 This is a tactic that has been especially common in cases concerning native title and the abuse of 
indigenous people– see Manderson, supra note 2 for an example of two such cases in Australia and Peter 
Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1990) for an example of a similar case that was heard in British Columbia.  However, it is not by 
any means confined to these cases. 
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decisions that arise from these cases.5  As Sarat and Kearns note however, even when 
judges fail to engage with the stories that are marginalised by their decisions, law “serves 
memory” by ensuring that the future remembers that a dispute for meaning occurred.6     
I interrogate the terms on which legal transcripts act as memory’s handmaiden.  While 
the work discussed in section two shows the power of transcript research to unearth 
hidden memories, I suggest that socio-legal scholarship has occasionally failed to pay 
regard to transcripts’ limitations.  In particular, this work sometimes mistakes the 
transcribed word as a “voice machine” (to borrow Sarat’s term) for the court proceedings 
it represents, or as a “mirror” (another of Sarat’s terms) for the person whose voice is 
transcribed.  The risk inherent in this conflation of transcript and subjectivity is that it can 
lead us to overlook the constraints imposed by the legal form and the process of 
transcription.  These constraints include: the fact that the story told in court may be 
“something more and something less”7 than the story that a witness would tell in other 
contexts and for other purposes; the fact that the transcript only memorialises one aspect 
of the court proceeding (the words spoken by certain authorised actors); and the 
compromises inherent in the translation of spoken proceedings into a written transcript.  I 
explain each of these constraints in greater detail in section two of this paper.  
Overlooking these constraints can lead the researcher to falsely believe that she 
understands and is able to empathise with the person whose stories she recounts – when 
in fact the researcher may be contributing to a recurrent pattern of domination of that 
                                                      
5 Manderson, supra note 2 at 109. 
6 Sarat and Kearns, supra note 3 at 14 – 15.  A striking example is given by the Haida case that is recounted 
by Goodrich, supra note 4.  Unusually, the judge ordered that the proceedings of an application by a 
logging company for an injunction against the Haida people be transcribed – presumably so that the 
Haida’s claims to sovereignty in the Queen Charlotte Islands and the basis on which these claims were 
made could be memorialized.   
7 Anne G. Walker, “Language at Work in the Law: the Customs, Conventions, and Appellate Consequences 
of Court Reporting” in Judith N. Levi and Anne G. Walker (eds.) Language in the Judicial Process (New 
York: Plenum Press, 1990) at 204. 
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person and appropriation of her subjectivity.8  By explicitly attending to the constraints I 
have identified, it may become possible for the legal transcript researcher to represent  
(re-present) the other’s stories as they appear in the transcript without repeating law’s 
tendency to appropriate or erase that other.9  
The methodology I propose in section three for reading and writing about transcripts 
builds on the predominantly Foucauldian work of other socio-legal scholars in this area 
using insights from the work of Jacques Derrida and Dorothy E. Smith.  There has been a 
“vast literature” spawned in law by Derrida’s lecture “The Force of Law”.10  This paper 
draws on that lecture and the associated literature, particularly the ethic of alterity (or 
otherness) proposed by Derrida in relation to law.  However, in the context of transcripts 
and how to read them, I am also interested in Derrida’s work on the relation between the 
spoken and written word – most particularly his book Of Grammatology.11  Drawing on 
Derrida’s work on the relation between spoken and written language, I argue in section 
three that the trial transcript can never merely reproduce the spoken proceedings it 
purports to represent.  While the written transcript is usually defined in (subordinate) 
relation to this spoken “other”, it is merely a similitude of the spoken proceeding it 
represents.  In Of Grammatology, Derrida suggested that rather than reading the written 
text as a perfect substitute for the spoken event, we should pay attention to the relation 
                                                      
8 Lucie E. White, “The Faces of Otherness: A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner and Cahn” (1991) 77 
Cornell Law Review 1499 [White, “Faces of Otherness” at 1511]. 
9 Jacques Derrida “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Jacques Derrida 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1991) [Derrida, “Force of Law” at 16].  See also Margaret 
Davies, Delimiting the Law (London: Pluto Press, 1996) at 2. 
10 Manderson, supra note 2 at 97 citing Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, (eds.) 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (Routledge: New York, 1992) as a good starting point for this 
literature.  Davies, ibid, is also deeply influenced by “The Force of Law”.  In this paper, I also draw 
extensively on White, “Faces of Otherness”, supra note 8 who does not cite Derrida but shares his 
vocabulary and his concern with the other. 
11 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak) (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1976). 
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between the signified event and the signifier.  Derrida’s method of revealing this 
relationship is deconstruction – by paying close attention to the text, it is possible to 
identify the unanswered question at its origin.12  I suggest in section three that the 
unanswered question hidden by the rhetoric surrounding the transcript is how to read the 
transcript’s claim to be a true reproduction of the court proceeding it memorialises. 
I partly answer this question using Dorothy E. Smith’s characterization of the text as a:  
                                                      
12 I must admit that, as a feminist, my decision to employ the deconstructive method is one about which I 
am, perhaps ironically, ambivalent.  Why should feminism make me cautious of deconstruction?  Many 
feminists have seen real possibilities in Derrida’s vision of binaries as being defined in relation to one 
another rather than necessarily importing hierarchy and the deconstructive method is unquestionably a 
useful addition to the array of analytic tools available to critical scholars.  For me, the “unanswered 
question” at the centre of the deconstructive method is the fact that the deconstructive reading necessarily 
asserts priority over the deconstructed text.  (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak raises this problem in the 
“Translator’s Preface” to Of Grammatology at lxxiv – lxxv.)  Derrida’s observation that there is a chain of 
signifiers is well made – you, the reader, may well choose to deconstruct my deconstruction of Derrida, in 
which case you claim priority over my text.  What does all this have to do with feminism?  In La 
Dissemination, Derrida compares textuality with dissemination – “seed spilled in vain”, “a proliferation of 
always different, always postponed meanings” (Spivak, “Translator’s Preface to Of Grammatology, supra 
note 11 at lxv).  Derrida compares the hymen to the “always folded (therefore never single or simple) space 
in which the pen writes its dissemination.”  (Ibid, at lxvi.)  Spivak calls the “hymeneal fable” feminist (ibid 
at lxvi.) (borrowed from Heidegger, the diagonal crossed lines denote that feminist is a term that is “under 
erasure” - it is presumptuous to believe that the problem is solved but the old term needs to be liberated – 
ibid at xv.)   
I disagree with Spivak.  In this binary hymen/dissemination, the deconstructive act of writing dissemination 
is masculine and the deconstructed space feminine – rather than being unfolded, the act of penetration, as a 
precursor to dissemination (deconstruction), ruptures the hymen (text).  Whether I deconstruct Derrida’s 
text or you deconstruct my deconstruction, Derrida’s priority is accorded to the masculine disseminating 
pen(is) rather than the feminine text.  Is this a problem?  Well, yes, to the extent that it demonstrates how 
difficult it is to avoid prioritizing one half of a binary, and how insidious the use of feminine language is to 
describe the passive, the subordinate, the penetrated half of the binary.  Of course, Derrida himself argues 
that language is inadequate to perform the task we ascribe to it.  But Derrida has not persuaded me that 
these hierarchical relations between binaries can be removed through deconstruction – I agree with Dorothy 
E. Smith that we operate in a world of the actual, although this world is partly constituted through 
language.  Language has real effects.  Deconstruction can help us to understand language, but this 
understanding must be supplemented with attention to the realm in which people work and play. 
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material object that brings into actual contexts of reading a standardized form of words or 
images that can be and may be read / seen / heard in many other settings by many others 
at the same or other times.13 
The trial transcript, being a paper or readable electronic document,14 fits Smith’s 
definition of “text”.  For legal researchers and courts of appeal alike, the key practical 
benefit of a trial transcript is that it supplies a detailed and replicable source of 
information about what took place in a local, particularised and subsequently inaccessible 
court proceeding.  Of course, this doesn’t mean that all researchers (or all courts) will 
read transcripts in the same way – part of Smith’s point is that the text does not change, 
but the reader and the context in which she reads are crucial to how the text is 
understood.15  One method of reading the text is to attend to the manner in which it is 
produced.  In relation to transcripts, this requires an understanding of the legal role of the 
transcript as the authoritative legal record of “what happened” in court and the power that 
this vests in the hands of the court reporter and appellate courts.  I discuss this legal role 
and this power in section three. 
The broader project of which this paper forms a part is concerned with the transcripts of 
certain criminal trials that took place in Canada and Australia in the 1990’s and early 21st 
                                                      
13 Dorothy E. Smith Writing the Social: Critique, Theory and Investigations (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999) [Smith, Writing the Social at 7].  See also Dorothy E. Smith, “Textually Mediated 
Social Organization” (1984) 36 International Social Studies Journal 59 [Smith, “Textually Mediated 
Social Organization”] for an early formulation of Smith’s theory of texts as the bridge between the local 
and the social. 
14 I exclude court recordings from my use of the term “transcript” in this paper although it should be noted 
that the characteristics of replicability and constancy that are ascribed by Smith to texts also apply to court 
recordings.  My exclusion of court recordings from the definition of transcript is functional – the following 
discussion problematises the notion that a transcript is “verbatim” and applies most closely (but not 
exclusively) to the transcript as a finished product.   
15 Dorothy E. Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990) [Smith, Conceptual Practices of Power at 177 – 199]. 
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Century.  These are trials in which a mother is accused of murdering her infant,16 in 
circumstances in which the defendant denies having killed her child.  The murder trials 
with which I am concerned are different from infanticide cases because neither defence 
nor prosecution alleges that the mother was mentally ill – the dispute in these cases is 
about how the baby died.  This dispute takes shape within two complementary 
discourses: a discourse of motherhood, in which the defendant’s behaviour as a mother is 
constructed as being consistent or inconsistent with social expectations about how “good” 
mothers behave; and a medical-scientific discourse about how to know the cause of a 
baby’s death.  Reading the transcripts of these cases allows a detailed consideration of 
how these powerful discourses “weave together” to produce a picture of the mother’s 
guilt or innocence and how these discourses also produce resistance.17  In the second part 
of section three of this paper, I explain the process by which transcripts are produced and 
suggest some ways in which understanding the relation between the written transcript and 
the court proceeding allows me to read these transcripts more effectively.     
Derrida’s work is philosophical and analytical whereas Smith is historical and materialist 
in her concerns.  The two disagree on some fundamental issues.18  However, for my 
                                                      
16 Or infants.  For readability, I have assumed here that a single death is at issue. 
17 Alison Diduck, “Legislating Ideologies of Motherhood” (1993) 4 Social and Legal Studies 461 at 466. 
18 Derrida tells us that we inhabit a textual system (Derrida, Of Grammatology, supra note 11 at 160) and 
that: 
“in what one calls the real life of these existences “of flesh and bone,” beyond and behind what 
one believes can be circumscribed as … text, there has never been anything but writing; there have 
never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a 
chain of differential references, the “real” supervening, and being added only while taking on 
meaning from a trace.” (Ibid at 158 – 159.) 
Smith takes a different view: 
“discourse, and the ruling relations in general, are, ontologically, fields of socially organized 
activity.  People enter and participate in them, reading / watching / operating / writing / drawing 
texts; they are at work, and their work is regulated textually … Society is emphatically, from this 
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purposes Smith and Derrida are both concerned with the relation between the written 
word and the events it seeks to describe.  I conclude this paper by suggesting that 
employing the insights of both these authors in addition to Foucault’s genealogical 
method reveals the transcript as being at once “something more and something less than 
what happened”19 in court.  In keeping with the law and society tradition, I am concerned 
not just with the legal role of a transcript as the authoritative record of a court proceeding, 
nor am I only interested in the potential value of the trial transcript as a means by which 
legal scholars can better understand the genesis of a given judgment.  Instead, while I 
make extensive reference to the law relating to the production of transcripts and the 
courts’ treatment of transcripts, I propose to reposition the transcript as a socially-
produced record of a process (a court proceeding) that is both quintessentially legal and 
saturated with the conditions of its production.  This repositioning allows me to read 
transcripts critically, with an eye to what they contain and a concern to unearth what they 
might efface.20 
2. The possibilities and limitations of socio-legal transcript research 
a. The possibilities of socio-legal transcript research 
My work fits within the diverse field of scholarship that is often referred to as “law and 
society”.  Law and society comprises an assorted group of scholars from a range of 
academic disciplines and any generalisation about law and society research risks 
oversimplifying the movement or excluding some of its key contributions.  Bearing this 
risk in mind, a central theme of law and society scholarship can usefully be noted.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                 
viewpoint, not an ensemble of meaning.  The social happens.”  (Smith, Writing the Social, supra 
note 13 at 75.) 
19 Walker, supra note 7 at 204. 
20 Sarat, supra note 1 proposed that a critical reading of trial transcripts requires the reader to attend to the 
“silences and exclusions” of the transcript (at 355).  His concern in this article was with transcripts as a 
memory of law’s rhetorical performance.  In this paper, I extend Sarat’s call for a critical reading of trial 
transcripts to include a call for a critical reading of the production of trial transcripts and a suggestion that 
trial transcripts must be read in light of the conditions of their production. 
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general terms, law and society scholars maintain a critical stance toward schools of 
jurisprudence, such as positivism and natural law, which purport to demarcate “law’s 
empire”.  Rather than seeking to define or purify law according to law’s posited 
essence,21 the law and society movement traces the mutually constitutive relationship 
between legal knowledge and social knowledge.22  Socio-legal transcript research fits this 
tradition in its concern to reposition the legal decision within the context of the social and 
legal dispute that the decision purports to conclude, thereby bringing excluded 
knowledges and alternative meanings to light.  
In Taxing Choices, Rebecca Johnson explains that she relied heavily on transcripts in 
writing her account of the Symes case23 because she wished to:  
reclaim the other voices presented in legal discourse ... illuminating the way the various 
judgments were affected by diverse texts, actors, strategies, and politics.24   
Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns similarly see the possibility for stories of resistance to 
emerge from a study of the minute detail of legal records, this time from the point of view 
of lawyers and litigants who participate in the creation of the court record: 
                                                      
21 By “essence”, I mean the search within jurisprudence for the origin of law or for a single, anterior 
location of law’s authority over the social. 
22 For a more detailed description of this aspect of law and society scholarship, see Davies, supra note 9 
passim but see especially the introduction.  Other authors who discuss this aspect of law and society 
include Frank Munger, “Mapping Law and Society” in Austin Sarat et al (eds.) Crossing Boundaries: 
Traditions and Transformations in Law and Society Research (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1998) and Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003). 
23 Symes v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 (Supreme Court of Canada); 
Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Symes [1991] 3 F.C. 507 (Federal Court of Appeal); Symes v. 
Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [1989] 3 F.C. 59 (Federal Court, Trial Division). 
24 Rebecca Johnson, Taxing Choices: The Intersection of Class, Gender, Parenthood and the Law 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 58 – 59. 
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Because the litigated case creates a record, courts can become archives in which that 
record serves as the materialization of memory.  Due process guarantees an opportunity 
to be heard by, and an opportunity to speak to, the future.  … The legal hearing provides 
lawyers and litigants an opportunity to write and record history by creating narratives of 
present injustices, and to insist on memory in the face of denial.  By recording such 
history and constructing such narratives lawyers and litigants call on an imagined future 
to choose Justice over the “jurispathic” tendencies of the moment.25 
The opportunity afforded by law’s insistence on due process to memorialise untold 
stories is also emphasised by Martha Minow, who argues that “legal rights matter … 
because they provide an opportunity to tell a story that might not otherwise get to be 
told.”26  Minow, Sarat and Kearns, and Johnson each articulate a version of the most 
commonly cited justification for using transcripts in socio-legal research. 
The concern to hear the untold stories of the law and to understand the decisions written 
by judges as a matter of choice and constraint27 rather than inevitability provides an 
excellent reason to conduct transcript-based socio-legal research.28  The drive to listen 
and bear witness to law’s subordinated stories stems in large part from the influence that 
has been exercised on socio-legal scholarship by Foucault’s genealogical method of 
history and Derrida’s ethic of alterity.   
                                                      
25 Sarat and Kearns, supra note 3 at 13.  Emphasis added, citations omitted.  
26 Martha Minow, “Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover” (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1860. 
27 Johnson, supra note 24 at [##insert]; Sarat and Kearns, supra note 25 at 7; Goodrich, supra note 4 at 183. 
28 The trend toward using an expanded range of sources in socio-legal research is not confined to case 
transcripts but is part of a broader interest in using sources that are not usually the subject of legal research 
in an effort to obtain a better understanding about the relationship between law and society – for example, 
Susan B. Boyd has made extensive use of the transcripts of parliamentary proceedings in her consideration 
of the evolution of child custody law in Canada – a recent example is Susan B. Boyd “Demonizing 
Mothers: Fathers’ Rights Discourses in Child Custody Law Reform Processes” (2004) 6 Journal of the 
Association for Research on Mothering 52.  Others rely on newspaper articles about legal issues – for 
example, Carmela Murdocca “The Racial Profile: Governing Race through Knowledge Production” (2004) 
19:2 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 153. 
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While Foucault spent very little time dealing explicitly with the operation of law, his 
understanding of the role of discourse in constructing our understanding of truth has had 
a profound effect on socio-legal scholarship. When writing or speaking about 
“discourse”, Foucault referred to the notion that experience and subjectivity are 
constituted through language.  Discourses are “frameworks which structure what can be 
experienced, or the meaning that experience can encompass”.29  Foucault defined 
discourse in reaction to what he saw as the totalising and stereotypical Marxist concept of 
dominant ideology; emphasising that discourses are manifold and competing.30  While a 
given discourse may attain dominance for a period of time in a particular location, this 
dominance itself produces resistance in the form of counter-discourses. 
In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”,31 Foucault challenged historians to move beyond the 
notion of history as linear, cause-predicated and progressive to an understanding of 
history as “a complex system of distinct and multiple elements, unable to be mastered by 
the powers of synthesis.”32  Proposing a methodology styled after Nietzsche as 
genealogical, Foucault exhorted historians to attend to the element of chance, “the details 
and accidents that accompany every beginning” – the discourses that succeed and those 
that are temporarily defeated.  Foucault’s history of knowledge emphasised  
                                                      
29 Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and the Law: Towards a New Sociology of Governance 
(London: Pluto Press, 1994) at 8. 
30 But see Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nations” 
in Martha Albertson Fineman and Isabel Karpin, Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal 
Regulation of Motherhood (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) and Susan Boyd “Some 
Postmodern Challenges to Feminist Analyses of Law, Family and State: Ideology and Discourse in Child 
Custody Law” (1991) 10 Canadian Journal of Family Law 79 for two examples of a body of scholarship 
that use the notion of ideology to analyse law without adopting a conceptualisation of the dominant 
ideology as relentless or unchanging.   
31 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in Paul Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984) [Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”].   
32 Ibid, at 83. 
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an ascending analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms … 
and then see how these mechanisms of power have been – and continue to be – invested, 
colonized, utilized … by ever more general mechanisms.33 
For Foucault, power was neither negative nor something that is “held” by particular 
people or institutions but was instead a relation of force that circulates, producing truth 
effects through discourse.34  Foucault’s conception of power and his genealogical method 
informs the search by socio-legal researchers to understand the outcomes of particular 
cases in light of the contest of discourses that is manifested in trial transcripts.  Court 
records, especially trial transcripts, offer the possibility of a minute consideration of how 
discourses emerge, are transformed, utilised, and discarded within legal processes. 
A second notion that has influenced socio-legal transcript research is the idea of an ethic 
of alterity.35  The ethic of alterity is most often explained in relation to Derrida’s work.  
In “The Force of Law”, Derrida sought to unpackage the modernist conflation of law and 
justice: “Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is 
incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable”.36  Because of the 
incalculable demands of justice and its “difficult and unstable” relationship with law, 
each instance of law is new and, to approach justice, each engagement with law requires 
a relation to the other rather than an appropriation or erasure of that other.37  While a 
legal decision purports to put an end to speculation or to effect a closure of the events 
with which it is concerned, that decision always retains a trace of the other.  Derrida 
                                                      
33 Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures” in Colin Gordon (ed.) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972 – 1977 (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980).  [ Foucault, “Two Lectures at 99]. 
34 Ibid, at 96. 
35 This paragraph is based on part of an essay I wrote for the Doctoral Seminar in term one.  This essay was 
titled “The Judicial Decision as a Performative of Law (or why is Mrs Clark sometimes murderous, 
sometimes ordinary but always and never both?)”. 
36 Derrida, “Force of Law”, supra note 9 at 16. 
37 Davies, supra note 22 at 2. 
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proposed an ethic of alterity, which would require legal decision makers (and legal 
researchers) to acknowledge and account for the other as a means of more closely 
approaching incalculable justice through calculable law.   
The ethic of alterity is partly a way of describing the need to try to understand and be 
generous to those who are different.  This includes understanding and giving voice to the 
people whose narratives are subordinated within the legal process – a key concern of 
socio-legal scholars when conducting transcript work.38  It also includes understanding 
and being generous to those who hold positions with which the legal researcher may 
disagree.39  The ethic of alterity informs my consideration of the first of the constraints of 
transcript research – the restrictions imposed on storytelling within the law.   
b. The limitations of socio-legal transcript research 
i. Storytelling within the law 
It has at times been fashionable to speak of the “stories” that can be found within the 
law.40  Law’s stories are manifold and the quest to know and understand these stories is 
the impetus for legal transcript research.  However, law’s stories are also constrained by 
the requirements of the adversarial legal form – witnesses are required to respond to 
questions rather than speaking freely41 and stories are likely to be tailored to the broader 
                                                      
38 Johnson’s reference to the “other voices” of the Symes case suggests exactly this ethical concern.  
Johnson, supra note 24 at 58.  Minow’s reference to “a story that might not otherwise get to be told” 
exhibits a similar priority.  Minow, supra note 26 at 1874. 
39 An example of this concern to understand the other with whom the author may disagree is provided by 
Johnson, supra note 24, at 177 - 180 
40 See for example the essays collected in Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz Law’s Stories: Narrative and 
Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).   
41 I discussed the implications of this constraint in one case, the trial of Lindy Chamberlain, in Emma 
Cunliffe, “Weeping on Cue: The Socio-Legal Construction of Motherhood in the Chamberlain Case” 
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, 2003).  A copy of this thesis is on file with the author and at the University of 
British Columbia library.  See Jill Hunter and Kathryn Cronin Evidence, Advocacy and Ethical Procedure: 
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objectives of the speaker in the context of the case.  The stories that are told in the legal 
forum are not necessarily the same stories that the speaker would tell at a different time, 
in a different place, to a different audience.   
The key contribution made by Derrida is that he suggests that, while understanding the 
other is an ideal to be striven towards, achieving that ideal can only happen momentarily, 
if at all.42  This seems nihilistic, but for me it speaks to the fact that I can only ever stand 
in relation to the other – I can’t become the other without one or both of us 
disappearing.43  For socio-legal researchers who are engaged in the Foucauldian-
influenced task of mining subordinated discourses, Derrida’s ethic of alterity speaks to 
the importance of remembering that it is never possible to present (or even know) the 
truth of the other, but only to see and represent a version or similitude of the other and to 
understand that version within the context in which it is produced.  This notion applies 
most clearly to the opposing interests within a particular litigation.  However, the ethic of 
alterity also informs our understanding of the relation between two people whose 
interests seem to be aligned.   
The relevance of the ethic of alterity within apparently allied relations and the limited 
nature of legal storytelling are both well demonstrated by a story recounted by Lucie E. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
A Criminal Trial Commentary (Sydney: Butterworths, 1995) at paras 607 – 609 for a discussion of the 
relation between credibility and the form of witness examination that is used in adversarial common law 
courts.  Dorothy E. Smith also discusses how the questions asked influence the account that is given in 
response in Conceptual Practices of Power, supra note 15 at 75 – 77. 
42 See Davies, supra note 22 at 112 – 113 – “The decision is that which is formative of the law in its 
(theoretically) closed state, because the decision continually concludes questioning about the law so that its 
processes may continue.”  I would argue that the academic treatment of a case operates similarly – legal 
scholars seek to explain a case in order to conclude questioning about how a particular outcome arose.  But 
in the course of purporting to close that avenue of enquiry, academic treatments of a case raise new 
questions and new responses.   
43 Ibid.  This notion is similar to that of Lacan in relation to the stages of child psychological development.  
Once a child recognizes his or her separation from the other of mother, he or she may strive to return to a 
unity with the mother but cannot achieve that unity without disappearing.  See Jeanne L. Schroeder, “The 
Vestal and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis” in Peter Goodrich and David 
Gray Carlson (eds.) Law and the Postmodern Mind: Essays on Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 
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White.  In “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the 
Hearing of Mrs G.”, White wrote about her experience of representing a black single 
mother – the eponymous Mrs G.44  Mrs G. was accused of receiving a welfare 
overpayment in circumstances in which the welfare office was arguably at fault.  White 
was faced with deciding which of two rhetorical devices (or stories) would most likely 
enable Mrs G. to avoid having to repay some of her welfare.  One option was to blame 
the welfare office for misleading Mrs G.  The other was to argue that Mrs G. had used the 
little extra money that she had received to buy necessities for her daughters.  In 
consultation with Mrs G., White decided to argue that the money had been spent to buy 
necessities – new school shoes and sanitary napkins.  Mrs G. arrived at court with shoe 
boxes and receipts, but much to White’s surprise, when Mrs G. gave evidence, she 
testified that the money had been spent on Sunday shoes for her daughters.  Mrs G. lost 
her case but, for reasons that White never learned, the welfare office immediately advised 
White that it had decided not to enforce the repayment order. 
In reflecting on the case, White ultimately concluded that the “necessities story” that had 
been agreed between White and her client excluded Mrs G.’s voice in favour of a concern 
to paint the “right” picture.  Mrs G.’s strategy was bolder in the end, but it worked – 
perhaps because it forced the representatives of the welfare office to regard her as “a 
person rather than a case”.  As White notes, Mrs G.’s “victory” (the decision by the 
welfare office not to enforce repayment) was at best ambivalent – while she did not have 
to repay the welfare overpayment, she remained poor, black and welfare dependant in a 
county (in a country) with a racist history and present.45  But White’s story is not really 
about the success of Mrs G.’s strategy or about her continued subordination – it is about 
                                                      
44 Lucie E. White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of 
Mrs G.” (1990) 38 Buffalo Law Review 1. 
45 Ibid, at 47. 
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the lesson that White herself learned from Mrs G. of how important it is for a lawyer to 
see her client (her other) as an authority in her client’s own life.46   
Mrs G.’s case demonstrates that it is possible for individuals to resist the knowledge 
claims of lawyers and the legal form and to tell their stories in ways that differ from law’s 
expectations.  However, only part of Mrs G.’s experience would have been revealed from 
a transcript of her case – Mrs G. told her story about her daughters’ shoes quite 
differently to the welfare office and differently again to White.  None of these versions of 
the story was necessarily more authentic than any other – but each was tailored to the 
audience and the forum.  White’s account of Mrs G. shows that law’s stories are partial 
stories, and that the process of choosing which part of the story should be told to law is 
coloured by law’s imperatives as well as the speaker’s priorities.  The danger of reading 
the transcript as a means of reclaiming the “untold story” of Mrs G.’s experience with her 
welfare agency is that it becomes possible to miss the partiality of the story she related to 
the courtroom.  This blindness can make us think that we are being empathetic with the 
other when in fact we are implicated in a recurrent pattern of domination by assuming 
that it is possible to know and understand her point of view on the basis of a courtroom 
narrative.47  The words that are memorialised in the transcript are likely to be something 
more and something less than the story that the other would tell if it were possible for her 
to speak her unfettered version of events.48   
                                                      
46 White sees the possibility for false empathy or false understanding to be the most significant danger of 
Foucauldian-based socio-legal research.  In an article written partly in response to a piece by Sarat, White 
wrote “We must seek, in our encounters with others, not just to map the power or read the text, but also to 
recognise, in all its alterity, the other’s face.”  White, “Faces of Otherness”, supra note 8 at 1511. 
47 White, “Faces of Otherness”, supra note 46 at 1508. 
48 Smith makes a slightly different, but related, point in Conceptual Practices of Power.  She identifies a 
split between women’s experience and the mode of participation in the relations of ruling.  Smith argues 
that, in order for a woman’s voice to be heard, the woman must translate her voice into the language and 
practices of the ruling relations.  Smith, Conceptual Practices of Power, supra note 15 at 3 – 4.  For Smith, 
the female voice that is memorialised in the transcript can never be an unalloyed representation of the 
speaker’s lived experience because the speaker has necessarily adapted her mode of being to the powerful 
institutional forum of the courtroom. 
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ii. The one-dimensionality of transcription 
Clients such as White’s may and possibly often do rebel against trial strategy in favour of 
speaking in their own voice.49  In other cases, a party may reject “legal translation” in 
favour of speaking to the court directly.  However, even when this occurs, the transcript 
will not represent the totality of the court proceedings or the party’s perspective on those 
proceedings.  An example of a party that eschewed lawyers in favour of speaking directly 
to the court is provided by Peter Goodrich.  He cites a case involving the Haida Nation, 
which defended an application by Western Forest Products Ltd for an injunction to 
prevent Haida members from interfering with WFPL’s logging activities on traditional 
Haida land.  The Haida arrived at the court in ceremonial dress, refused to appoint a 
lawyer and called witnesses who told stories, sang songs and produced sculptures to 
defend their claim that they held exclusive rights over Haida land.  Justice McKay 
initially encouraged the Haida Nation to appoint a lawyer – but his advice was refused by 
the Haida because “the issue of our lands is too important to leave in the hands of lawyers 
who are unfamiliar with our people”.50 After this refusal, Justice McKay heard the 
witnesses brought by the Haida and directed the production of a transcript of the Haida 
evidence.  Ultimately, however, Justice McKay declared himself constrained to consider 
only the technical legal question of whether the Haida had interfered with a valid logging 
licence.51   
                                                      
49 Arguably Lindy Chamberlain is an example of another such client.  During the trial in which the Crown 
alleged that she had murdered her daughter Azaria, she clashed privately with her own counsel as to the 
best means of presenting her story.  The result of this clash was a disjuncture within the defence narrative 
that, I have argued elsewhere, increased juror suspicion of Chamberlain’s truthfulness and of the integrity 
of her lawyers.  Emma Cunliffe, “Weeping on Cue: The Socio-Legal Construction of Motherhood in the 
Chamberlain Case” (LL.M. Thesis, 2003 unpublished: on file at the University of British Columbia Law 
Library and with the author). 
50 Quoted by Goodrich, supra note 27 at 180.   
51 Goodrich, ibid at 179 - 184.  Goodrich explains this case as an example of law’s refusal to recognise the 
other, characterising Justice McKay’s decision as Pontius Pilate-like: “this washing of hands, had as its 
underside the annihilation of the opposing language” (Goodrich at 183).  My reading of the case as it is 
recounted by Goodrich (I have not read the transcript) is slightly different – if Justice McKay was only 
Emma Cunliffe 




The Haida case is an unreported decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia and 
the only “public” legal record of the case is a trial transcript which is held by the court 
but Goodrich reports that it cannot be copied or removed from the court.52  Entombed in 
the court registry, this thousand page transcript documents an untold story of a legal 
event that reveals a great deal about the problematic nature of First Nations relations and 
legal pluralism in Canada.53  Retelling the Haida’s story on the basis of the transcript 
allows the Haida’s act of rebellion to become more widely known and the implications of 
the case to be pondered.  However, the transcript does not convey everything there is to 
tell about the case – for example, although the Haida elders appeared in ceremonial dress: 
No comment was made as to the ceremonial dress, nor was evidence allowed as to its 
significance.  It was passed over in silence, it was not seen, it was not a language which 
the court was prepared to countenance: before the law there are only individuals, subjects 
that can be reconstructed as legal actors, abstract subjects, individuals without clothes, 
certainly without all that clothes imply, namely the social and ceremonial dimensions of 
collective and ethnic life, the material and social habitus of the individual.54 
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that before the law there are only the properly 
clothed (those who wear the apparel of lawyers – in some jurisdictions, the wig and 
gown) and those whose clothing is passed over without comment, but not without being 
noticed.  The transcript is stripped of this dimension entirely.  If the clothing worn by the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
concerned to morally absolve himself from implication in the annihilation of Haida land, why did he make 
the unusual direction that the transcript be produced from the court recording?  And why did he allow the 
Haida to introduce witnesses who could easily have been construed as legally irrelevant to the proceeding 
at hand (by allowing these witnesses, Justice McKay ensured that their evidence was included in the 
transcript, even if it did not influence the legal outcome)?  In keeping with the ethic of alterity (see text 
accompanying note 39, supra), I believe that it is possible that Justice McKay truly felt himself to be 
constrained to grant the injunction but hoped that the act of memorializing the Haida point of view would 
create the possibility of change via another means. 
52 Ibid, at 179, note 1. 
53 See John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2002) for an account of the history of legal pluralism in Canada. 
54 Ibid, at 181. 
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Haida was not commented upon by anyone whose words were recorded by the court 
reporter, it did not find its way into the transcript.  The meaning of the Haida’s decision 
to wear ceremonial dress (and even the fact that they wore this dress) was therefore 
hidden entirely from the face of the transcript.  Other aspects of “the material and social 
habitus of the individual” – her clothing, her accent, her affect – are similarly routinely 
absent from a transcript of her trial.   
By paying attention to the relation between the form of the trial and the conditions of 
production of the transcript, it becomes easier to avoid conflating the narratives 
memorialised on the face of the trial transcript with the subjectivity of the person whose 
story the researcher wishes to tell.  The absences that I have identified in relation to the 
Haida case and Mrs G.’s hearing are accompanied by other, more subtle distortions that 
are produced by the process of transcription.  Some of these aspects are explained further 
below. 
iii. Translating the courtroom proceeding into written form 
A small but (for my purposes) important group of legal scholars are concerned with 
explaining the trial transcript as text.  These scholars seek to displace the myth that trial 
transcripts are or can ever be “a mirror / a record / a voice machine”.55  Perhaps the most 
illuminating work in this field has been done by Anne G. Walker, who was a court 
reporter before she entered linguistics.  Walker’s work is largely concerned with 
rebutting the pretence that a transcript is or ever can be “verbatim”.56   
                                                      
55 Sarat, supra note 1 at 356. 
56 U.S. law governing court reporters requires a court reporter to produce a “verbatim” transcript.  Walker, 
supra note 7.  The comparable Australian and Canadian requirements are discussed in section three of this 
paper. 
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The notion of “verbatimness” assumes and reinscribes a hierarchy identified by Derrida 
between spoken and written language57 – the court reporter’s legal role is to subordinate 
her text to the spoken words of others.  However (as Derrida would predict), this is an 
impossible task: 
what actually constitutes a “word”[?] (Is a nod a word? Is “uh” a word? Is a stammer, a 
stutter, a false start a word?) … For the lawyers and judges whose speech and acts 
“make” the record, these aspects of verbatimness, if recognized at all, are connected more 
with the readability of a record than with any potential appellate significance.  For the 
court reporters, who “take” the record, verbatimness is a daily ad hoc problem that must 
be coped with.58  
The problem faced by the court reporter extends beyond false starts and stuttering.  The 
reporter must decide how to punctuate speech when it is transformed into a written record 
and whether to correct a speaker’s grammar.  On this latter issue, Walker reports on the 
basis of a survey she conducted of court reporters that court reporters are most likely to 
“correct” the speech of judges and more likely to correct the speech of advocates and 
expert witnesses than that of lay witnesses.59  One justification given for this is that lay 
witnesses, speaking under oath, should have their utterances recorded more precisely.  
This justification is difficult to sustain in light of the fact that the vast majority of appeals 
from criminal trials conducted in front of a jury arise from a claim that the trial judge 
misdirected the jury.  It is also difficult to understand how the witness’s oath is more 
solemn than the duty owed by the judge and lawyers to the administration of justice.  A 
second justification, contained in a textbook that was endorsed by the National Shorthand 
Reporters’ Association until 1989, is that:  
                                                      
57 Derrida, Of Grammatology, supra note 11 at 8.  Derrida’s treatment of this hierarchy is explained further 
in section three of this paper, below. 
58 Walker, supra note 19 at 213. 
59 Ibid, at 224. 
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Presumably all judges and most if not all lawyers are men of education, and they will 
resent having attributed to them in stenographic reports ungrammatical and carelessly-
phrased remarks.60 
Again,61 one can only refer to the fact that many criminal appeals arise from the 
aforementioned “carelessly-phrased remarks”.     
Another significant tendency Walker has identified, at least in the USA, is that court 
reporters (and court reporting manuals) generally edit dialect out of the record for all 
witnesses.  Walker quotes a court reporter who responded to her questionnaire as writing 
- “No one attempts to reproduce dialect.  What may sound like dialect to one is normal 
pronunciation to another.”  Walker notes “a professionwide reluctance to put into a 
transcript any of the features of speech that might mark a person’s origin.”62   
What are the implications of this reluctance to report dialect for socio-legal scholars who 
seek to tell subordinated stories?  On the one hand, reporting standard English greatly 
enhances the readability of transcripts.  On the other hand, removing dialect means that 
the speaker’s membership of a subordinated social group may be less apparent from the 
face of the record than would otherwise be the case. 63  Returning to Mrs G.’s hearing, it 
is highly unlikely that anyone referred to Mrs G. as black during her hearing – and if this 
fact remained unspoken, any transcript would also exclude this information.  If Mrs G. 
had patterns of speech that identified her as African-American, it is highly likely that 
                                                      
60 National Shorthand Reporters’ Association, English (Virginia: NSRA, 1983) quoted ibid, at 218. 
61 Aside from the objection that even in 1983 when this textbook was printed, not all judges and lawyers 
were men. 
62 Walker, supra note 19, at 219.  In fact, in America, the appearance on the transcript of an expression such 
as “Mm-hmm” can form sufficient grounds for appeal.  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Stufflet [1980] 
419 A.2d. 184 cited by Walker at 236. 
63 John Gibbons provides a very useful analysis of the tension between accuracy and readability in 
transcription.  John Gibbons, Forensic Linguistics: An Introduction to Language in the Justice System 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2003) at 27 – 35. 
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those speech patterns would not have been reproduced in a transcript of her hearing.64  
Far from being the authorless text of legal scholars’ imagination, what starts to emerge 
from Walker’s work is a trial transcript that is carefully and selectively edited in ways 
that have the potential to significantly alter the representation of subordinated voices.  
Most particularly, the assumptions underlying the micro-linguistic analysis that is 
undertaken by some legal scholars on trial transcripts must change if the words that are 
reported in the transcript are not necessarily the words that were spoken in court.  
However, Walker’s insights do not nullify the usefulness of trial transcripts: they simply 
provide a warning to socio-legal scholars to read transcripts carefully and critically, with 
an eye to the context in which the transcript was produced.   
Walker’s findings suggest to me that, in the American courts she studies, trial transcripts 
are produced in ways that reveal the institutional bias of their site of production (the 
courtroom) and the manner in which they are commissioned (by courts in some 
jurisdictions and by lawyers with court approval in others).  This demonstrates the 
importance of Smith’s admonishment to attend to the institutional context within which 
the text is produced.65  A key step in developing a methodology of transcript research is 
to consider whether Walker’s findings hold in the jurisdiction in which the relevant 
transcripts are produced.  It seems likely that they do – the difficulties identified by 
Walker will not miraculously disappear in Canada or Australia.  However, that 
expectation requires further research in order to become an assertion.  For my purposes, 
this means considering court reporting practice in the State of Victoria, Australia and the 
                                                      
64 The fact that this can be a problem is illustrated by a conversation I recently had with a legal historian 
who told me that she had been researching sexual assault trials in Canada.  She was particularly interested 
in a case that had occurred in Yellowknife, in which a woman was accused of sexual assault after allegedly 
kissing another woman.  This was one of the earliest, and one of the few, sexual assault cases she had found 
that involved a lesbian act.  After searching the archives and the public records about the case, my 
colleague spoke to some people who had been involved in the case – they informed her that the defendant 
was black.  Arguably this fact (which was not contained in any written record) casts a whole new light on 
how to read the case.   
65 Smith, Writing the Social, supra note 13 at 85 – 86. 
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province of British Columbia, Canada.  In section three of this paper, I make a start 
toward such an investigation. 
3. Toward a text-based understanding of the trial transcript 
a. Derrida, Smith and the relationship between spoken and written language 
I noted in section two that the US law relating to transcription seems to privilege the 
spoken word over the written transcript by requiring “verbatim” transcription even 
though verbatimness is practically impossible.  Similarly, forensic linguists focus their 
studies of courtrooms on spoken language rather than the written trial transcript.66  
Structural linguists including Saussure asserted “linguistics to be a study of speech alone, 
rather than speech and writing.”67  These are examples of a tendency that Derrida 
identified in Of Grammatology as pervasive in Western thought – the ascription of 
authenticity to the spoken word and unreliability to the written word.68  Writing in 
response to Saussure, Derrida “relates this phonocentrism to logocentrism – the belief 
that the first and last things are the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the infinite 
understanding of God, an infinitely creative subjectivity, and closer to our time, the self-
presence of full self-consciousness.”69  Derrida suggests that the spoken language is 
privileged in the binary spoken / written, not just by linguists but also by western 
                                                      
66 See for example, John M. Conley and William M. O’Barr Just Words: Law, Language and Power 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Gregory M. Matoesian, Law and the Language of Identity: 
Discourse in the William Kennedy Smith Rape Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
67 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translator’s Preface” to Derrida, Of Grammatology supra note 11 at lxvii 
– lxviii.  This privileging of the spoken word over the written word is discussed further below. 
68 Derrida, Of Grammatology supra note 11 at 37. 
69 Ibid. 
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philosophers.  Within this paradigm, the written language is seen merely as “a 
supplement to the spoken word”.70  Derrida explains further that: 
With an irregular and essentially precarious success, this movement would apparently 
have tended … to confine writing to a secondary and instrumental function; translator of 
a full speech that was fully present (present to itself, to its signified, to the other, the very 
condition of the theme of presence in general).71 
By defining speech as “presence” in opposition to the written text as “absence”, the 
“unanswered question” posed by language’s inability to represent the signified without 
altering it is obscured.  In Of Grammatology, Derrida proposes that a reading of the 
written text which has regard to the way in which the signifier alters the signified allows 
the reader “to see the text coming undone as a structure of concealment, revealing its self-
transgression, its undecidability.”72  This does not “unlock the way to truth” but allows us 
to see the relationship between the written trial transcript and the spoken trial “not that of 
patency and latency but rather the relationship between two palimpsests”, each containing 
the trace of the other.73   
By adopting Derrida’s formulation of the relationship between spoken and written 
language as one of differance rather than hierarchy, it is possible to view the trial 
transcript as defined in relation to the proceedings of the spoken trial and containing the 
trace of that other.  Equally, the trial itself, which is largely predicated on oral evidence 
and oral argument, is always conducted partly with regard to the written record that will 
emerge.  The written transcript is not an incomplete or inferior representation of the 
                                                      
70 Ibid at 7. 
71 Ibid at 8. 
72 Spivak, “Translator’s Preface”, supra note 67 at lxxv. 
73 Ibid. 
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spoken truth of the courtroom, but a text.  This text should read in its own right, carefully 
and with a view to finding contradiction.   
As I noted in the introduction, Smith focuses on texts in a somewhat different way from 
Derrida.  Smith’s definition of the text as “replicable”74 is not confined to written texts 
but also to media such as video and audio recordings.  However, given my focus on trial 
transcripts as a written or electronic readable text, my discussion of Smith’s text-based 
theory will focus on written texts.  Because of the attributes of materiality and 
replicability, Smith regards the text as the “technology” that coordinates relations of 
ruling and the local activities of actual people.75   
The materiality of text and its replicability create a peculiar ground in which it can seem 
that language, thought, culture, formal organizations, have their own being, outside lived 
time and the actualities of peoples living. … It is the materiality of the text itself that 
connects the local setting at the moment of reading into the non-local relations that it 
bears.76 
The key insight that can be derived from seeing the text as a material object is the 
revelation that texts are not “neutral systems of representation external to the organization 
they produce and regulate.  The production of forms to correspond to and realize locally 
the forms and norms borne by text-mediated discourse is not confined to Disneyland.”77  
The transcript presents itself as a window into the reality of the courtroom.  In doing so, it 
suppresses the conditions and conventions of its production.78  By paying attention to the 
way in which texts are produced and the institutional context within which that 
                                                      
74 Smith, Writing the Social supra note 13 at 7. 
75 Ibid, at 79. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid at 85 – 86. 
78 Smith, Conceptual Practices of Power supra note 15 at 78 – 80. 
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production occurs, it becomes possible to see institutionalised biases within those texts.  
Why are transcripts are produced?  When are they produced?  Who produces them?  By 
asking these questions, we can begin to see not only that transcripts are different from the 
spoken proceedings that they represent, but also that the surface of transcripts “both 
organize and conceal the social relations … [through which they] are fed into the lives 
and doings of others, becoming their constraints, contingencies, opportunities and 
disasters.”79   
The remainder of this paper represents an attempt to find a way of reading transcripts that 
reflects the similarities and differences between spoken and written language.  I seek to 
attend to the technologies of production of the transcript without positing the transcript as 
an imperfect representation of the courtroom’s truth or conversely asserting that the 
transcript represents a truth of its own.  My intention is not to devalue the transcript – to 
the contrary, I regard the transcript as an immensely valuable resource because it 
mediates between the local practice of the courtroom and the seemingly transcendent 
judgment.  However, the transcript conceals a particular social organisation of knowledge 
even as it reveals the meanings that are hidden by the legal judgment.  Understanding this 
social organisation of knowledge is largely a practical task – it involves an inquiry into 
the laws that govern transcript production, how they are produced and who produces 
them.  Perhaps the most important reason why transcripts are produced is for use in 
appeal proceedings.  Unpacking the production of transcripts therefore requires an 
understanding of the jurisdictional and procedural imperatives of appeal courts as these 
imperatives might be experienced by a court reporter, an appellant, a lawyer and a judge.  
Of course, it is not possible to do justice to each of these perspectives in a paper of this 
kind.  Accordingly, in the next two sub-sections I begin to trace the law relating to 
transcript production and suggest how this work could be extended to encompass 
transcription practices and conventions. 
                                                      
79 Smith, Writing the Social supra note 13 at 82. 
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In the next section of this paper I discuss the law of transcription in criminal proceedings 
in the State of Victoria, Australia and in the Province of British Columbia in Canada.  
These two jurisdictions are, respectively, the jurisdiction of my training and the place 
where I now live and work.  They provide examples of transcription practices in 
Australia and Canada, but transcription practices within these countries varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction – for instance, the laws and practices organising transcription 
in New South Wales differ in important ways from those of Victoria.  Considering the 
law relating to transcript production is an important part of understanding the institutional 
context in which transcripts are produced.  However, a consideration of the law is not 
itself adequate to understand the practices of court reporters within the relevant 
jurisdictions.  Obtaining this information requires further study – for example, obtaining 
the manuals used by court reporters may allow the researcher to understand transcription 
conventions and interviewing or surveying court reporters could permit an understanding 
of editing practices.  This information is not included in this paper.   
b. Relevant criminal and evidence law in Victoria and British Columbia 
In Australia, criminal law is largely a state jurisdiction.  Common law criminal offences 
including murder have been codified in Victoria in the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.) (Crimes 
Act).   Defendants who are accused of murder are committed to stand trial in the 
Magistrates’ Court and their trials occur in the Supreme Court of Victoria.  The 
production of evidence in Victorian courts is governed by the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic.) 
(Victorian Evidence Act).    
In Canada, criminal law falls within federal jurisdiction.80  Part VIII of the Criminal 
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Criminal Code) deals with homicide.  The production of 
evidence in criminal trials is governed by the Canadian Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-
5 (Canadian Evidence Act).  In British Columbia, homicide is prosecuted by the B.C. 
                                                      
80 Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act 1867. 
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Attorney-General in the B.C. Supreme Court, which court consists of federally appointed 
judges.  Canadian criminal law is also influenced by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which guarantees the right to life, liberty and the security of the person (section 7) and 
provides certain specific rights in sections 11 and 14 to persons charged with an 
offence.81   
Part VI of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 governs the production of 
transcripts in Victoria.  Section 130(1) of the Act provides that a judge may order that 
any evidence in a proceeding be recorded and transcribed “in any manner that he or she 
directs.”  It appears that criminal trials are routinely recorded82 by the Victorian 
Government Reporting Service but that not all proceedings are transcribed (i.e. converted 
from recorded or shorthand form to a written or electronic text).  Rule 2.17 of the 
Supreme Court (Criminal Procedure) Rules 1998 (Vic.) provides that where a person 
appeals from a decision in a criminal trial, the court registrar may direct that the 
shorthand record or recording of that trial be transcribed by a competent person or 
persons.  Rule 2.19 provides that the appellant and respondent may obtain a copy of the 
transcript from the registrar.  The cost of transcript production in criminal proceedings is 
met by the State of Victoria.83 
In British Columbia, court reporting and transcription services are provided by private 
contractors.  A party who wishes to appeal from a judgment must find out which 
                                                      
81 Kent Roach, Criminal Law (2nd ed., 2000).  Accessed electronically via Quicklaw on 24 March 2005. 
82 Supreme Court of Victoria Practice Note No. 3 of 2002 provides that civil proceedings in the Supreme 
Court will be transcribed as a matter of course.  The Supreme Court of Victoria website states that the 
Victorian Government Reporting Service (VGRS) “provides transcript for all criminal proceedings in the 
Supreme Court” (http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au).  However, there does not appear to be a practice 
note equivalent to No. 3 of 2002 in relation to criminal proceedings, nor does any applicable legislation 
provide that all criminal proceedings must be transcribed.  In fact, rule 2.17 of the Supreme Court 
(Criminal Procedure) Rules 1998 seems to assume that all criminal proceedings will be recorded but that 
they will not necessarily be transcribed unless the need arises. 
83 http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au. 
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companies or individuals are authorised to produce the transcript and pay that contractor 
to produce the transcript.84  As is the case in Victoria, B.C. Supreme Court criminal cases 
are recorded as a matter of course but that transcripts are only produced upon request.  
Rule 6(5) of the Criminal Rules of the Supreme Court of British Columbia 1997 provides 
that an appellant from a verdict or sentence in a criminal case must furnish proof that a 
transcript has been ordered to the court registry within 14 days of an appeal being lodged.  
The cost of transcription may be considerable if the trial was long.85   
The B.C. Legal Services Society (BCLSS) offers legal aid to applicants who are 
financially eligible and whose legal problem fits within the Legal Aid criteria.  For a 
single person, annual income must be less than $17,640 in order to qualify for legal aid.86  
A defendant to a criminal charge is eligible for Legal Aid if he or she could go to jail in 
the event of being convicted, or if he or she meets certain alternative criteria.87  These 
criteria, particularly the financial eligibility rules, are likely to exclude many criminal 
defendants.  Even if a defendant qualifies for legal aid at first instance, a criminal appeal 
will only be funded if BCLSS determines that the appeal is likely to succeed or the 
defendant is a respondent to the appeal. If the criminal appellant does not qualify for legal 
aid, he or she must meet any costs of appealing from a conviction (including 
transcription) or apply for court assistance under section 684 of the Criminal Code.88 
                                                      
84 http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/courts/general/order_transcript.htm. 
85 Telephone conversation with Reportex, the private firm that is contracted to prepare Supreme Court of 
B.C. (Vancouver registry) transcripts.  The appellant is required to pay for the crown’s copy of the 
transcript as well as for the copies used by the court and the appellant’s own copy.  This telephone 
conversation was conducted on 30 March 2005. 
86 http://www.lss.bc.ca/legal_aid/doIQualifyRepresentation.php (accessed electronically on 1 March 2013). 
87 http://www.lss.bc.ca/legal_aid/criminalLaw.php (accessed electronically on 1 March 2013). 
88 Section 684 of the Criminal Code provides: 
(1)  A court of appeal or a judge of that court may, at any time, assign counsel to act on behalf of 
an accused who is a party to an appeal or to proceedings preliminary or incidental to an appeal 
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The requirement that is imposed on criminal appellants to pay for transcript has been 
challenged several times in British Columbia and Alberta (where the rules are similar to 
those in B.C.).  The first of these challenges occurred in Alberta in R. v. Claude 
Robinson.89  In this case, Robinson argued that section 684 of the Criminal Code when 
read together with section 7 of the Charter90 required the Alberta Court of Appeal to 
direct the preparation of a court book (including a transcript) at the Province’s expense on 
behalf of an indigent appellant who had been refused legal aid.     
The Alberta Court of Appeal held that it was not obliged to order the production of a 
province-funded transcript, finding after a long survey of historical treatments of the 
“right” to obtain transcripts that: 
the foundation of appellate review in Alberta is the printed transcript but unless there is 
entitlement to it by statute or by the payment of the fee for its preparation, that transcript 
has never been given to a convicted appellant upon his demand. If legal aid (including 
that available under section 684) is declined, the appellant remains responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
where, in the opinion of the court or judge, it appears desirable in the interests of justice that 
the accused should have legal assistance and where it appears that the accused has not 
sufficient means to obtain that aid. 
(2)  Where counsel is assigned pursuant to subsection (1) and legal aid is not granted to the 
accused pursuant to a provincial legal aid program, the fees and disbursements of counsel 
shall be paid by the Attorney General who is the appellant or respondent, as the case may be, 
in the appeal. 
(3)  Where subsection (2) applies and where counsel and the Attorney General cannot agree on 
fees or disbursements of counsel, the Attorney General or the counsel may apply to the 
registrar of the court of appeal and the registrar may tax the disputed fees and disbursements. 
89 [1989] A.J. No. 950 (Alberta Court of Appeal) (Accessed electronically by Quicklaw on 30 March 2005).  
I have used the appellant’s first name because, confusingly, the relevant B.C. authority is also R v 
Robinson. 
90 “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
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cost. To urge otherwise, as a principle of fundamental justice, is not historically 
supportable.91 
The Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Claude Robinson was followed by the 
B.C. Supreme Court in R. v. Kimberley Robinson.92  Kimberley Robinson was ineligible 
for legal aid on financial grounds and represented himself at trial before the Provincial 
Court of B.C.  He was convicted of two out of six counts.  Interestingly, his success in 
defending four of the counts against him was one of the grounds on which Justice Blair 
denied Robinson’s application for provision of a transcript at the Province’s expense: 
Mr. Robinson presents as an articulate person who acted on his own behalf at the trial 
following which he was convicted on just two out of six charges under the Wildlife Act, a 
success which reflects positively on his competency to act for himself.93 
R. v. Claude Robinson was mentioned in the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.) 
[J.G.].94  Lamer C.J.C., writing on behalf of the majority, noted that cases including R. v. 
Claude Robinson adopted criteria to determine whether a criminal accused was eligible to 
receive legal assistance under section 684 of the Criminal Code and section 7 of the 
Charter.  However, Lamer C.J.C. expressly stated that his reference to R. v. Claude 
Robinson should not be taken as a comment on the correctness of that decision.95 
                                                      
91 R. v. Claude Robinson per McClung J.A. (Harradence and Côté JJ.A. concurring), supra note 89 at 
paragraph 67 [footnotes omitted]. 
92 R. v. Kimberley Robinson [2002] B.C.J. 1693 (Quicklaw, accessed electronically on 30 March 2005). 
93 Ibid, at paragraph 9.  Blair J was following the criteria specified by Justice Hinds of the B.C. Court of 
Appeal for use in determining an application under section 684 of the Criminal Code – see Re. Baig and the 
Queen (1990) 58 C.C.C. (3d) 156 (B.C. Court of Appeal) (Quicklaw accessed electronically on 30 March 
2005). 
94 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 at paragraph 90 per Lamer C.J. and Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Major and Binnie JJ 
(Quicklaw accessed electronically on 30 March 2005). 
95 Ibid. 
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As things stand in British Columbia, criminal trial proceedings are recorded as a matter 
of course but will not be transcribed unless an appeal is lodged or one of the parties 
otherwise elects to pay for transcription.  Either way, if a defendant seeks transcription 
but is not funded by Legal Aid, it is extremely likely that the defendant will be required 
to pay for the production of the transcript.  In Victoria, proceedings are routinely 
recorded but transcription only occurs as required (usually when an appeal is lodged).  
Unlike B.C., in Victoria the cost of transcription in criminal matters is borne by the State 
of Victoria.   
Several points of note emerge from this survey for socio-legal transcript research.  In 
both Victoria and British Columbia, transcripts are prepared as an exception and not as a 
rule.  In these jurisdictions, the mere fact that a transcript exists marks the case as unusual 
– most likely, one in which the defendant appealed from an initial decision.  The 
defendant who appeals in British Columbia must either have the financial means to pay 
for transcription or be legally aided in his or her appeal.  In Victoria, an appellant is 
entitled to transcription but is also likely to depend on legal aid or private means for other 
aspects of his or her appeal.  Far from containing every one of law’s untold stories, trial 
transcripts in these jurisdictions represent a privileged few cases within the current 
criminal justice system.  Legal researchers who wish to use legal transcripts to understand 
the social and legal context from which a case arose must either confine their work to 
transcribed (i.e., usually, appealed) cases, apply to be permitted to (pay to) transcribe case 
recordings96 or seek to obtain recordings of court proceedings via Freedom of 
                                                      
96 In Linter Group Ltd (in liq) & Anor v Price Waterhouse (a firm) & Ors [2000] VSC 90 (20 March 2000), 
Justice Harper of the Supreme Court of Victoria ordered the production of a transcript at the request of a 
news publisher, finding that the preparation of the transcript was in the interests of the transparent 
administration of justice.  However, he also ordered that the news publisher pay for the transcript.  This 
unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria can be accessed electronically via 
www.austlii.edu.au.  I was unable to find a similar case in B.C., although there are several decisions in 
which a court has ordered discovery of a transcript from an earlier proceeding in a new proceeding. 
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Information legislation.97  Where a transcript has not been produced, it may be difficult to 
obtain tape recordings or shorthand notes if considerable time has elapsed since the 
proceedings concluded.  If Sarat is right when he writes that in “the transcription of trials 
law provides the raw material from which history may subsequently be authored”,98 it is 
important to add that the history (even the legal history) enshrined in transcripts is partial 
and incomplete.  The promise of “speaking to the future” through litigation is also 
impugned if there is no guarantee that your words will be archived. 
c. What laws apply to court reporters in British Columbia and Victoria? 
The Official Reporters Regulation 1984 (B.C. Reg. 222/84) (Official Reporters 
Regulation) provides that court reporters in B.C. must be current members of the B.C. 
Shorthand Reporters’ Association and be able to write shorthand manually or by 
stenotype at a speed of at least 200 words per minute.99  Court reporters are officers of the 
court and must take an oath that they will “faithfully and accurately” record “evidence 
given on examination and at a proceeding and everything said by counsel and the judge, 
master or registrar”.100  Where no court reporter attended a proceeding, an authorised 
                                                      
97 An innovative way around this limitation appears from the decision in Ontario Criminal Code Review 
Board v. Hale and Others [1999] O.J. 472 (Ontario Court of Appeal, 28 September 1999).  In this case, the 
respondents applied under s. 10 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act R.S.O. 1990, 
c. F.31 for access to backup audio tapes prepared by the court reporter at their hearings.  The Ontario 
Criminal Code Review Board (Board) denied these applications on the basis that these tapes were not 
under the Board’s control but were controlled by the court reporter who was an independent contractor to 
the Board.  The court reporter who was also named as a party in this case alleged that the only record that 
was under the Board’s control was any transcript that was prepared from the stenographic notes and audio 
tapes of the hearing.  The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the audio tapes constituted part of the 
Board’s records or alternatively that the Board had control over the audio tapes.  Accordingly, the Court 
ordered that access to these tapes be provided.  A copy of this decision can be obtained at 
http://www.gov.on.ca/MBS/english/fip/jr/p912ca.htm (accessed on 30 March 2005).   
98 Sarat, supra note 1 at 358 – 259. 
99 Official Reporters Regulation, rule 1.2. 
100 Ibid, rule 2.1. 
Emma Cunliffe 




court reporter may be commissioned to prepare a transcript based on a recording of that 
proceeding.101 
If a transcript is prepared, the authorised court reporter must certify that the transcript is 
“complete and accurate”.102  In turn, the registrar certifies the transcript,103 at which time 
the transcript becomes “evidence of the official record.”104  The Official Reporters 
Regulation also stipulates the format for the transcript (e.g. page size, margins and the 
format in which the style of cause must be specified).105   
It is striking that the Official Reporters Regulation requires the court reporter to certify 
that the transcript is “complete and accurate” rather than that it is “verbatim”.  Although 
the rules appear to assume that transcription will be verbatim,106 the law does not 
expressly require a word-for-word record.  British Columbia (or, more properly, Canada) 
does not specify an offence of wilfully mis-transcribing court proceedings or wrongfully 
certifying a transcript.  A situation of this sort would likely be dealt with as a breach of 
the court reporter’s oath and be prosecuted as perjury under section 131 of the Criminal 
Code. 
One B.C. case in which the accuracy of a transcript was impugned by an appellant is H.F. 
v. Canada (Attorney-General).107  In H.F., the appellant complained that she had been 
                                                      
101 Ibid, rule 2.2(3). 
102 Ibid, rule 3.01(1.1). 
103 Ibid, rule 3.01(3). 
104 Ibid, rule 3.01(4). 
105 Ibid, schedule 1. 
106 The only reference to “verbatim” text appears in Schedule 1 in relation to the formatting that should be 
adopted “if the last line of verbatim text extends beyond line 37 on the last page of a proceedings 
transcript”.   
107 2002 BCSC 325 (Quicklaw accessed on 30 March 2005) [H.F.]. 
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sexually assaulted while she was a student at the Sechelt Indian Residential School.  Her 
action in tort for damages was dismissed on the basis that she had failed to prove that she 
had been assaulted.  The appellant alleged that inconsistencies in her evidence had arisen 
because her discovery examination had been incorrectly transcribed by the court reporter.  
Neilson J. of the B.C. Supreme Court dismissed this allegation, holding that “[w]ith 
respect to her answers at discovery, I accept the transcript as the official record”.108  
Neilson J.’s refusal to countenance the possibility of mis-transcription was absolute – 
there is no indication that any party suggested going back to the audio recording or 
shorthand notes of the discovery examination in order to check the transcription.   
In another B.C. case, Grenier v. Wagner,109 the appellant asked the court reporter to 
check her notes in circumstances in which he believed that the court reporter had mis-
transcribed his answer.  The reporter responded “that she had checked [the relevant] 
passage against her notes; that it corresponded word for word; that it was possible that 
she had made an error and transposed the names …, but that she did not believe that to be 
the case.”110  Errico J. chastised counsel for asking the court reporter to check her notes: 
I have the greatest misgivings about this practice adopted by counsel.  Accepting 
it for what it is worth, I am of the view that the transcript ought to be accepted as 
it stands over Grenier's refusal to accept a portion of it.  Grenier's credibility and 
accuracy of recollection is, in my view, no challenge to the accuracy of a Court 
Reporter's sworn transcript.111 
                                                      
108 Ibid, at paragraph 162. 
109 [1991] B.C.J. No. 2570 (Quicklaw accessed on 30 March 2005). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
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These cases suggest that, once a transcript is certified by the court reporter, it is 
extremely difficult to challenge its accuracy.112  Even if the court reporter herself admits 
that it is possible that the transcript contains an error, the court will accept the fact of 
certification ahead of the reporter’s admission.  In a sense, the trial transcript becomes the 
history of the case, to the exclusion of alternative recollections.   This accords with 
Smith’s account of the social role of the text – provided that transcription conventions 
appear to have been followed, the transcript comes to “stand in for the actuality it claims 
to represent.”113  From the court’s point of view, the transcript serves to “stabilise” the 
memory of the trial and that stabilisation is privileged over the (subsequently 
inaccessible) event itself.114  This stabilisation is justifiable (and is rhetorically justified) 
because of the court reporter’s oath to record the trial “completely and accurately”.  Law 
uses the rhetoric of the court reporter’s impartiality and professionalism to suppress any 
perspective on the transcript that might cause it to be read as something less than a mirror 
of the proceedings it remembers. 
In Victoria, section 131 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act provides that 
evidence that is recorded pursuant to that Act must be recorded by a shorthand writer or 
mechanical means.  A person who records evidence is an officer of the court and is under 
the direction of the court in relation to both recording and transcribing evidence.115  
Section 135 of the Act provides that transcripts and court recordings made in accordance 
with the Act “when certified as correct by the shorthand writer or the person recording 
the evidence or the person preparing the written transcript are evidence of anything 
recorded in the notes, record or transcript.”   
                                                      
112 In R. v. Jack Cewe Ltd. [1982] B.C.J. No. 1911, the B.C. Court of Appeal held that the onus was on an 
appellant to demonstrate that the transcript was faulty or incomplete.  The appellant in that case had not 
discharged that onus.   
113 Smith, Conceptual Practices of Power supra note 15 at 73 – 74. 
114 Ibid, at 74 – 75. 
115 Section 133 of the Victorian Evidence Act. 
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Any person who wilfully records or transcribes evidence “in a false or incorrect manner”, 
or “tampers with or alters or falsifies” evidence or wilfully certifies false or incorrect 
evidence to be correct is guilty of a criminal offence punishable by up to 5 years 
imprisonment.116  Unlike B.C., Victoria does not specify the qualifications required of a 
court reporter and nor does it specify the format in which transcripts must be produced.  
My research117 suggests that there have been no cases in Victoria that consider the 
question of what is a “correct” transcript or what might constitute transcribing evidence 
in a “false or misleading manner”.  However, the terminology “correct”, “false” and 
“misleading” (together with the fact that transcripts do not appear to be challenged in 
Victoria) suggests that a similar stabilising and suppressing effect occurs in that 
jurisdiction to the approach I have explained in relation to B.C. 
In Victoria and B.C., court reporters hold a position of trust.  They are expected to 
transcribe what is said in court “accurately and completely”.  Once the court reporter has 
certified that she has fulfilled this duty, the B.C. cases I have surveyed suggest that the 
courts are extremely reluctant to look behind the surface of the transcript, even in 
circumstances where the accuracy of the transcript is impugned.  This prioritisation of the 
written transcript over the spoken word (contra Derrida) suggests a judicial preference 
for the stability of the record over fidelity to the speaker’s intention.  As Smith suggests, 
once it is produced the transcript literally serves to stand in for the court proceeding that 
it represents. 
The courts’ refusal to countenance challenges to the accuracy of a transcript suggests that 
the purpose of producing transcripts is not only, as Sarat suggests, one of 
memorialisation.  It may also have something to do with justice being balanced with 
pragmatism – the trial transcript proves that the law allows its subjects to speak but law 
                                                      
116 Ibid, section 137. 
117 Using the “noteup” feature of Austlii – www.austlii.edu.au. 
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closes the door on that opportunity once the court is no longer in session.  While the 
appeal process allows the defendant a second chance to place him or herself before the 
law, that second chance is jealously guarded, rarely given freely and rarely successful.   
Transcripts are not always produced – they are exceptional documents, their production is 
accessible only to a privileged few defendants who have the financial means to appeal 
their convictions or who are legally aided.  Reading transcripts in light of their 
exceptional nature allows socio-legal researchers to displace the assumption that they are 
discovering hidden treasures – “untold stories” – within the transcript.  The stories that 
are transcribed represent a small, and institutionally skewed, group of the many stories 
heard by our criminal courts each year.  This is not to say that these stories are 
unimportant, but they should be read in light of the conditions in which they are 
produced. 
Transcripts are produced by court reporters, who are employed by courts or lawyers.  The 
relationship between court reporters, judges and lawyers is arguably reflected in the 
practice adopted by court reporters in the USA of editing the speech of judges and 
lawyers so that the record shows “what they meant to say” rather than what they actually 
said.  Does the same thing happen in Victoria and British Columbia?  Probably.  
However, no one has published a study of court reporting practice in these jurisdictions 
that compares to Walker’s work. I have had difficulty obtaining information about the 
working practices of court reporters.  In itself, this provides an insight into the 
institutional place of transcripts – they are documents to be received and read as a 
“complete and accurate” entity – not documents that should be read as the outcome of a 
process of drafting and editing. 
Transcripts are perhaps the single most significant source of information, other than 
precedent and statutes, for appellate decisions in common law countries.  But as 
documents that primarily deal in “facts”, they are not accorded the importance that is 
given to the more “legal” judicial decision – they are excluded from the privileged 
definition of law.  In keeping with that inferior status, transcripts are regulated very 
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stringently in some ways.  When the transcript is threatened, however, the law asserts the 
transcript’s finality and refuses to engage with the manner in which transcripts are 
produced.  This refusal produces an illusion of a transcript that just “is” – the work of the 
court reporter in producing and editing the transcript is rendered invisible in favour of a 
vision of the transcript as a miraculous mirror in which the court proceeding is rendered 
complete.  It helps that the reflection held up by the transcript is in many ways a 
favourable one to those who stand in judgment.  Unpacking this “reflection”, noting its 
small flatteries and the realities it obscures, allows the socio-legal researcher to attend 
more carefully to the stories that she reads and to the people about whom these stories are 
written. 
4. Conclusion 
Law and society scholars in Australia and Canada are increasingly turning to trial 
transcripts in an effort to find other stories and other voices.  Trial transcripts do not 
merely provide the basis for appeal courts to consider a case; they are a textual site of 
memory that offer socio-legal scholars an opportunity to unpack the judicial act of 
choosing among competing narratives about a case.  By returning to the transcripts, 
researchers can reposition the legal judgment within the context of the dispute from 
which it arose.  This is an effective means of challenging law’s claims to coherence and 
ineluctability.   However, the richness and depth of transcripts conceals their socially 
constructed nature, their partiality and the institutional constraints underpinning their 
creation. 
Reading the transcript as a mirror of the court proceeding can lead socio-legal researchers 
to overlook the ways in which transcripts direct the researcher’s attention to a finely 
calibrated picture of “what happened” in court.  It is equally important to consider what 
the transcript excludes.  Other versions of the story that is told to the court may exist, but 
will be excluded because they are adjudged legally irrelevant or strategically 
inappropriate.  Only the words spoken by those who are recognised by the court as being 
authorised to speak are transcribed – this approach excludes unauthorised “interjections” 
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and non-verbal forms of communication.  The process of transcribing spoken English 
into written English is replete with compromises and value judgements about what should 
be “corrected” and what should be reported unchanged.   
To these constraints, which apply to any transcript, an understanding of the law and 
practice of transcription in Victoria and B.C. adds other insights.  Not every trial is 
transcribed.  Once produced, the transcript is taken by the court to “stand in” for the 
proceeding it represents.  Provided that the transcript is certified as authentic, the court’s 
tendency is to reject in strong terms any suggestion that the transcript might be 
inaccurate.  The transcript is effectively rendered as an “authorless text” – the conditions 
of its production are suppressed so effectively that it is difficult to discover the 
conventions used by court reporters in B.C. and Victoria.  The transcript therefore serves 
to “stabilise” the history of the trial – rather than reflecting the trial with all its 
indeterminacies, slurred words and dialect, it replaces the trial with a text in standard 
English that is unchanging and replicable.   
One of the very earliest descriptions of the kangaroo by a European was written by 
Captain James Cook.  Cook explained: 
I saw myself one of the animals which had been so often described: it was of a light 
mouse colour, and in size and shape very much resembling a greyhound; and I should 
have taken it for a wild dog, if instead of running, it had not leapt like a hare or deer.118 
Law deals in the currency of words, particularly written words, and lawyers are 
especially prone to believe that all of life’s experience can be reduced to a description.  
As Derrida noted, language is often inadequate for the task we prescribe to it and, like the 
                                                      
118 John Hawksworth, An Account of the Voyages Undertaken by the Order of His Present Majesty, for 
Making Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, and Successively Performed by Commodore Byron, 
Captain Wallis, Captain Carteret, and Captain Cook, in the Dolphin, the Swallow, and the Endeavour : 
Drawn up from the Journals which were Kept by the Several Commanders and from the Papers of Joseph 
Banks, Esq (London : Printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1773) at 561.  This extract appears 
electronically at http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/exhibitions/history/xaustcat.html.    
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early European visitors to Australia, law’s actors grapple daily with the task of translating 
an often strange and incomprehensible world into an explicable, relatively seamless 
narrative.  Like the kangaroo described by Cook, the transcript is both more and less than 
the sum of its parts – the transcript is a text that accomplishes the task of rendering law’s 
daily practices into a stable, replicable history of the present. 
Reading the transcript as a text has important implications for socio-legal research.  
While retaining the sense of a transcript as a site of history, a place with the potential to 
“remember the future”,119 it repositions that site within the context of its creation.  The 
histories that are enshrined by the transcript are partial and the futures that are promised 
are incomplete.  The transcript is not a miraculous mirror, but rather a prosaic and 
imperfect rendering of law’s prosaic and imperfect processes.  Reading the transcript in 
light of the constraints and imperatives of its creations may help to avoid the temptation 
to laud the transcript as something more than the sum of its parts.   
 
                                                      
119 Sarat, supra note 1; Sarat and Kearns, supra note 6; Minow, supra note 26. 
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